British imperialism in africa
British imperialism in africaThe motives of Britain's imperialist activities in Africa from 1869 to 1912 were strategic and defensive. While other motives did exist, such as to colonize, to search for new markets and materials, to attain revenge and world prestige, to convert natives to Christianity, and to spread the English style of orderly government, the main motives evident in many events of the period showed attempts to safeguard the country and protect former land holdings. As its free trade and influential relationship with Africa was threatened, Britain began to turn trade agreements into stronger and more formal protectorates and even colonies. Britain acted to protect the route east and its connection with the Indian Empire. Rather than to expand the British Empire, Britain fought battles over territory to prevent French or German control in Africa.
Britain's imperialist involvement in the scramble for Africa occurred in response to the actions of the French and even German. Britain had a history of African trade agreements and, compared to its European counterparts, the highest degree of control in Africa. France and Britain began an earnest race for the Niger in 1883, agreeing then to divide the territory--Lagos to Britain and Timbuktu for France. This did not neutralize the competition, however. Britain had to act in Nigeria (1885) and Nyasaland (1891) to protect existing spheres of commercial and missionary activities. France's strategy to declare its "right of occupation" and then seek negotiation further urged Britain's aggressive maintenance of territory. The British annexed Bechuanaland (1885) partly to guard against the Germans; partly to prevent its absorption by the Transvaal, which would have increased the power of the Boers. (Faber 57-58) Later, in 1888, the French threatened the Britain dominated Nile Valley, hinting they might divert the water of the Nile to render the area useless.
In East Africa the British had strategic motives to protect the Suez Canal and the route to the east. As the scramble exploded in the 1880s, Britain was suddenly challenged for her right to trade and conduct financial and military business. "The prime object was defensive [in the eighties], as it had been under Disraeli: the prevention of serious inroads on British power; the anticipation of other powers, when strategically necessary, in the 'Scramble for Africa'; the protection of the route to India and the East. The safety of the Suez Canal had already become a cardinal point of British policy."...
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